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Gerlach v. Donnelly1 involved an action by the alleged maker of two
promissory notes to cancel the same. The suit was brought against the
estate of the payee, an attorney, who evidently committed suicide the day
following his arrest for conspiring to murder his client, the present plaintiff!
The notes were found in a search of the attorney's office after the arrest.
In his complaint the plaintiff alleged that he had no knowledge or
recollection of having executed the notes, but admitted that he had
signed, without reading them, numerous papers prepared by his lawyer,
whom he trusted implicitly.
The trial before the circuit judge resulted in a decree holding that
the plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden of proving either lack of
consideration or that the signatures on the notes were forged. The supreme
court reversed, holding the prima facie case for the validity, or the
"presumptive validity," of the notes was overcome by the testimony for
the plaintiff including an admission in a letter from the deceased, shortly
before his death, that plaintiff was not indebted "for any current legal
services." There was no evidence of any unpaid charges remotely approxi-
mating the amount involved, over $32,000. The court also emphasized the
special fiduciary Telationship existing between attorney and client. A number
of Florida cases were cited to illustrate the care with which the court has
always felt contracts between attorney and client should be scrutinized,
and how the burden should be placed on the attorney to establish their
fairness.
In contrast to the rule of simple contracts, sections 24 and 28 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law2 raise a presumption of valid consideration
and put the burden of proving absence or failure thereof upon the person
alleging it, usually the defendant.8 In the instant case, where the maker
of the promissory note was the plaintiff, there would appear to be a double
reason for placing on him the burden of proving absence of consideration. 4
Despite this, it is submitted that the supreme court's finding of "over-
whelming evidence" rebutting the presumption of consideration should not
be criticized. It is hard to ignore the cloak and dagger background in
reviewing the case. The greater difficulty involved in recovering over
$32,000 on promissory notes, procured by the fraud alleged, from a live
maker than from his solvent estate would constitute a motive for murder.
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1. 98 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1957).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 674.27, 674.31 (1957).
3. BRITrON, HANDBOOK ON TIE LAw oi, BILLS & NOTES 403 (1943).
4. tlickiman Lunbeck Grocery Co. v. Hager, 75 Colo. 554, 227 Pac. 829 (1924).
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The fact that with knowledge of his pending arrest decedent practically
denied the existence of the notes does, by inference, substantiate plaintiff's
story as to how they were obtained.
'lie emphasis placed by the court upon the high standard of conduct
required of an attorney in his contractual relations with his client seems
pertinent and well taken. The case could be cited as a dictum to the
effect that when a negotiable note is signed by a client to pay for legal
services, an attorney payee does not get the benefit of sections 24 and 28
of the Negotiable Instruments Law with regard to the burden of proving
abscnce or failure of consideration.
Whitehall Realty Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Co.- was an action
on promissory notes executed by the maker in payment for goods to be
supplied to the maker by the payee some two or thrce months before the
due date of the notes. Defendant contended that since the plaintiff knew,
at the time it discounted the notes for the payee, that the consideration
for them was executory, the defense of failure of consideration would be
good. The court, in upholding a directed verdict for the plaintiff, stated that
this knowledge would not prevent the plaintiff from being a holder in due
course.
Under section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law,6 a holder in order
to be a holder in due course must take the instrument in good faith. Under
section 28,7 failure of consideration is not a good defense as against a holder
in due course. The question then is simply whether the taking of an
instrument with knowledge that it was issued for an cxccutory consideration,
but without knowledge that the payee had broken his contract constitutes a
good faith taking. It is almost uniformly held that it docs.8 Knowledge
that the consideration was executory does not impose a duty to inquire
if the consideration had failed. The holding, then, is clearly in accord
with well established principles.
In Land v. I-Hart'0 the executor of the payee's estate brought an action
on five checks executed by the defendant drawer. Lick of consideration
was pleaded as a defense and the defendant was permitted to testify
thereto over plaintiff's objection. On this appeal from a judgment for
the defendant it was admitted that the testimony should have been
excluded, but dcefendant claimed plaintiff had waived the protection of
the "Dead Man's Statute"'' by cross-examining the witness. The court
5. 100 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1958).
6. FLA. STAT. § 674.54 (1957).
7. F.A. STAT. § 674.31 (1957).
8. BlirroN, IHANDBOOK ON Tile LAw oF BILS & NOTES 450 (1943).
9. Robertsou v. Northern Motor Sec. Co., 105 FIa. 644, 142 So. 226 (1932);
Grinnel Say. Bank v. Gordon, 195 Iowa 208, 191 N.V. 852 (1923).
10. 109 So.2d 589 (Fla. App. 1959).
I. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1957).
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held there was no waiver, and since there was no other evidence of
want of consideration, plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict.12
Since tnder the Negotiable Instrument Law the burden is placed upon
the defendant to prove absence of consideration, 13 the holding was clearly
correct.
Vester v. iigdon 4 reaffirmed the rule that the only distinction between
scaled and unsealed negotiable notes is with regard to the application
of the statute of limitations; 20 years in the former and 5 years in the
latter.'5 Payment tolls the running of the statute, and this action being
brought on sealed notes within 20 years of such payment was held not
barred.
Section 6(4) of the Negotiable Instruments Law,' provides that "The
validity and negotiable character of an instrument are not affected by the
fact that it bears a seal." The common law rule was generally contra. A scaled
instrument was a very formal contract including all the terms and all the
parties; hence the seal destroyed negotiability.' 7 A number of courts hold
that on negotiable instruments the seal is still operative not only with regard
to the statute of limitations, but also that the jurisdictional rule as to the
effect of the seal importing consideration will be applied.' 8 Thus, in some
states absence of consideration would not be a good personal defense on
a sealed negotiable instrument. The Florida rule limiting the effect of the
seal to the applicable statute of limitations would appear the better one) 9
Mayflower v. Suskind 0° was decided principally upon a procedural
pleading issue. It was held that the affirmative defense of want of considera-
tion, though not sworn to, was available to the defendant in an action on
a note. The court then stated, in accordance with the principles already
discussed in this survey, that defendant would have the burden of establishing
want of consideration by a preponderance of the evidence.
In Machetei v. Campbell,21 the guardian brought a bill to cancel
a note and mortgage executed by the ward during incompetency. The
decree of cancellation was affirmed, but the supreme court held that the
defendant could recover, on his counterclaim, the consideration which was,
in legal contemplation, received by the maker.
12. In Cerlach v. Donnelly, 98 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1957) the "Dead Man's Statute"
was held not to prevent testimony as to how the notes were procured. The decision did,
however, adequately distinguish between allegations denying intentional execution of the
instrument which would be adnissable, and allegations denying consideration for a note
intentionally executed and delivered, which would be excluded.
13. See statutes cited note 2 supra.
14. 110 So.2d 470 (Fla. App. 1959).
15. F.A. STAT. § 95.11(l)(3) (1957).
16. FIA. STAT. § 674.07(4) (1957).
17. BRiTTON, I IANraOOK ON THE: LAw OF BILLS & NorTEs 28 (1943).
18. Ballict v. Fetter, 314 Pa. 284, 171 Atl. 466 (1934); Kennedy v. Collins, 30
Del. 426, 108 At]. 48 (1919) (disapproved in 29 YAI.E I.J. 345 (1919)).
19. See case notes 27 CoILuM. L. R, Ev. 870 (1927), 26 Nlich. L. Rev. 208 (1927).
20. 112 So.2d 394 (Fla. App. 1959).
21. 102 So2d 722 (Fla. 1958).
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The holding indicates that the insanity of the maker is a real defense
in Florida available even as against a holder in due course of a promissory
note. The defendant was referred to as a holder in due course and it was
assumed lie had no knowledge of the incompetency of the maker when be
received the note. Only quasi-contractual recovery for services performed was
permitted; the note itself was cancelled.
There exists a conflict with regard to the defense of insanity, some
jurisdictions holding it unavailable as against a holder in due course.22
The opposing view, 2 adopted in this case, would seem better. Under
section 60 of the Negotiable Instruments Law,2  the maker of a promissory
note "engages that lie will pay it according to its tenor." An engagement
necessarily involves an assent to be bound. An incompetent, incapable of
such assent, cannot bind himself. 2
In Chemical Corn Exch. Bank 6 Trust Co. v. Frankel,2 the
defendant set forth that the note had been filled in, and her signature
as maker written by her husband. The note was then mailed to her and her
husband instructed her by telephone to send the note to the bank to be
applied on an existing indebtedness. Defendant followed instructions though
she was aware she had not signed the note herself. In reversing the circuit
court judgment for the defendant the district court of appeal (Third
District) held that even though her signature was a forgery, defendant
would be liable if she knowingly ratified the signature as her own either
prior or subsequent to delivery of the note. Since the instructions of the
trial court to the jury on this question of ratification were considered
wholly inadequate, the case was remanded for a new trial.
Authorities are in conflict with regard to whether a forged instrument
may be ratified. 27 In this case the district court seems to assume that it
may be in Florida. However, the case could not be accurately cited as
authority for this proposition, as the facts do not actually involve a true
ratification situation. This term, in negotiable instrument law, refers to
ratification after the note has been negotiated and not to the approval
or adoption of the signature prior to delivery to the payee as claimed
here.28 If the latter is proved, all courts would probably agree that the
effect would be just as though the signature were genuine.29 In any event,
the decision remanding the case for a new trial would appear clearly
correct in that the jury was not given adequate instructions with regard
to the question.
22. In Rath's Committee v. Smith, 180 Ky. 326, 327, 202 S.W. 501, 502 (1918)
the court stated, "The contract of a lunatic, in the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, accepted in good faith, must be upheld."
23. Hillsdale Nat'l Bank v. Sansanse, 11 N.J. Super. 390, 78 A.2d 441 (1951).
24. FLA. STAT. § 674.62 (1957).
25. BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 17, at 550, 586.
26. 111 So.2d 99 (Fla. App. 1959).
27. 10 C.J.S. Bills 6- Notes § 495 (1938).
28. First Nat'l Bank v. Albright, 111 Pa. Super. 392, 397, 170 At]. 370, 373 (1934).
29. UNIFORN NEco-nARLa INSTRUMENTS LAW § 19; FLA. STAT. § 674.21 (1957).
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